The Russian-backed influence exercise that led Romania to overturn its presidential election results mirrors operations carried out this year in Moldova and other countries, according to Romanian intelligence reports and Moldovan officials. It is said that there is.
Last week, Romania’s Constitutional Court issued an unprecedented decision to annul Karin Georgescu’s first-round victory. Declassified documents from the Interior Ministry and domestic and international intelligence agencies say the far-right candidate “illicitly benefited” from a “sophisticated” and “massive” social media campaign backed by Russia.
A similar tactic was used in Moldova’s general election in October, with authorities in Chisinau saying the Russian government spent up to $100 million this year to sway voters opposed to EU membership and backing a pro-Russian presidential candidate. We estimate that there is a possibility. They warned that the methods used were likely to be replicated in other democracies.
German intelligence agencies have already warned of possible Russian interference in February’s parliamentary vote.
In Romania, Georgescu, a previously little-known ultranationalist who has praised Russian President Vladimir Putin and fiercely criticized NATO and the European Union, polled in the single digits for most of the campaign. Despite this, they secured 23% of the vote in late November. .
A network of more than 100 paid influencers with a total of 8 million followers was deployed to boost Georgescu on TikTok and other social media platforms, according to a declassified memo from Romania’s Interior Ministry. In the two weeks prior to the vote, Georgescu was ranked 9th in the world for trending topics on TikTok.
The Interior Ministry said “some of the opening sentences” used by influencers to promote Gheorgescu were the same as those used in posts supporting pro-Russian candidate Alexander Stoianoglo in the Moldova vote. Announced.
Romania’s domestic intelligence agency SRI said Mr Georgescu’s social media activity was “coordinated by state agencies” with the help of “a very good digital marketing company”. About 25,000 TikTok accounts “became highly active in the two weeks before the election,” but about 800 of them had been mostly dormant since 2016, when they were first created.
Romanian authorities on Saturday raided the home of Bogdan Pešičil, 36, a programmer named by SRI for “financing” Mr Georgescu’s promotion on social media.
SRI said Pešcil made “more than 1 million euros in donations” to unspecified accounts on TikTok and paid $381,000 to influencers to promote Georgescu in the month before the election. Georgescu declared that he had not spent any money on his campaign.
Prosecutors said Peszcil, who is from the central city of Brasov, is being investigated on suspicion of money laundering and illegal campaign financing. According to local media, investigators also found $7 million worth of cryptocurrency assets in the name of Peshcil.
Pessil could not be reached for comment. In a Facebook post, he called the allegations “false” and added that he was under no obligation to publicly disclose his income.
Similar allegations were made in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in June, when pro-Moscow Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk allegedly accused the Kremlin through the Czech Republic-based news organization Voice of Europe. He was accused of running a scheme in which he paid politicians to promote it. Advertisement.
Moldovan officials told the Financial Times that election interference is no longer as simple as handing out cash in envelopes on election day, but that campaigns are being run on social media and payments to influencers are being made in cryptocurrencies. He said traditional monitoring methods such as election observers and party funding regulations are in place. It’s outdated.”
“There is no single solution to digital election interference,” said Stanislav Sekriel, national security adviser to Moldova’s President Maia Sandu. “Currently, interference moves at lightning speed and circumvents laws before they can be implemented.”
The Russian government scoffs at any suggestion that it is behind such influence operations. “The Russian side is not involved in Romania’s electoral process. In general, we do not have a habit of interfering in elections in other countries,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said last month.
TikTok said it fully complied with domestic and EU laws and removed the account reported by Romanian authorities.
However, the declassified document notes that videos that were not flagged as political ads were posted to other accounts even on voting day, which is illegal under Romanian law.
Georgescu denied any ties to Russia, saying his only relationship was “with the Romanian people and God.” He vowed to take legal action against the Constitutional Court’s decision and staged protests in front of closed polling stations on Sunday, when the run-off was due to be held.
Some influencers admitted they were tricked into promoting Georgescu.
Alex Stremiteanu, who has more than 50,000 followers on TikTok, admitted in a post that it would be “stupid” to participate in a paid campaign presented as an effort to encourage people to vote. He said the hashtags he was instructed to use, such as “2024 Presidential Election,” were attracting “bots” to comment sections and posting links that redirected viewers to Georgescu’s content.
“I’m sorry for being used like a dog in this campaign without knowing what I was doing,” Stremiteanu said.
Other influencers named in the appendix compiled by SRI denied receiving any money and said they were supporting Mr. Georgescu out of conviction.
Karin Donka, who has more than 600,000 TikTok followers, said in a post that she supports Georgescu even though she feels unfairly targeted and under surveillance. “I pushed for change. For better or for worse, I don’t know, but it was probably the change that I and many Romanians were waiting for.”
