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Your Guide to Washington and the World’s 2024 US Election Means
The author is a senior researcher in China for Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific Programme
Europe continues to be furious at the controversial foundations of the Trump administration to end the war in Ukraine, but some officials have questioned whether China can step up its peace-broking efforts. Beijing’s continued approach to cool distances will become a silent but important potential player when negotiating a ceasefire, but the situation is complicated.
China is keen to increase its height as a world peace supervision, as demonstrated by Israeli-Hama’s intervention on conflict. However, in Ukraine, it appears they want to do this without burdening the substantial responsibility of providing security guarantees.
China enjoys close ties with Russia. A few weeks before Ukraine’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the two reaffirmed the “no-limit” partnership that Beijing first mentioned in 2021. NATO considers China to be the “decisive enabler” of the Kremlin war effort, and Beijing will provide important support to Moscow’s industrial bases.
This strong trend to maintain relations with Russia is driven by geographical and strategic needs. The two countries share a 4,300km border, roughly equivalent to the length of Europe. Beijing’s long rivalry between the US and the US-led world order has been heightened by the pursuit of China’s first Trump administration’s stake in containment strategies, colouring the view of its bond with Moscow. In recent years, the two have been able to demonstrate their position on the world stage through joint military exercises and coordination within multilateral organizations, offsetting US domination.
However, in light of Trump’s sudden U-turn on policy against Ukraine, Beijing is now worried about a swift US-Russia reconciliation. Although it nominally supports a “consensus” between Washington and Moscow, the close relationship between the two will displeased Beijing after investing in both trade expansion and diplomatic capital in bilateral relations with Russia. As Moscow’s top trading partner, China has made a significant contribution to the Kremlin. This can be used to encourage Russia to accept a ceasefire. In a potential ceasefire agreement, you have a voice – although smaller, should not go against China’s interests. It may actually present a confluence of interests with the US.
Beijing’s reluctance to become an active peace broker is also due to the deficit of trust with the political elite in Europe. The Chinese leader’s recent trip to Europe has been aimed at preventing further damage to relations with the continent since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, Beijing’s efforts did not work with European audiences. Most of the European audiences recognize Russia and its allies in black and white terms. The more Beijing tries to explain its relationship with Moscow, the deeper the distrust Europe feels about it. The “risk-taking” talk from the EU’s economic perspective added further tension to its relationship with Beijing.
China must also be careful not to explicitly exploit the current breakdown of the Transatlantic Alliance. Doing so could rattle Trump to press for a globally more stringent China containment strategy.
Beijing’s limited involvement in broker peace may not meet expectations from Europe or Ukraine, but it was by no means a real intention of China to be involved in repeated negotiations. Navigating through a contradictory set of interests, he could continue “making the right noise” and at the same time responding to Trump’s unorthodox diplomatic strategies, coupled with the thinly covered threat of an economic war against China.
There are hints that Chinese leaders may feel conflicted about the Kremlin. Judging from various official statements released since May 2022, Beijing has omitted the infamous “no limit” partnership. This quiet removal of bromance language may indicate a sense of suffering in the Beijing part about links with Moscow. Putin’s permanent partnership with the complete conflict with the West could have dire consequences for China’s own political and economics, but abandoning its biggest nuclear neighbour is equally dangerous. Like other relationships, even “no limit” requires boundaries for Beijing’s relationship with Moscow.
China now has to strike a delicate balance in its dealing with Russia. The opportunity to end the war in Ukraine should be used to enhance its position as a force in the world. But it also has to maintain relations with Russia – there is a risk crossing the red line, with the repeated divisions between China and the Soviet Union 60 years ago.
